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Abstract
Mathematical models of scientific data can be formally compared using Bayesian model evidence. Previous applications in
the biological sciences have mainly focussed on model selection in which one first selects the model with the highest
evidence and then makes inferences based on the parameters of that model. This ‘‘best model’’ approach is very useful but
can become brittle if there are a large number of models to compare, and if different subjects use different models. To
overcome this shortcoming we propose the combination of two further approaches: (i) family level inference and (ii)
Bayesian model averaging within families. Family level inference removes uncertainty about aspects of model structure
other than the characteristic of interest. For example: What are the inputs to the system? Is processing serial or parallel? Is it
linear or nonlinear? Is it mediated by a single, crucial connection? We apply Bayesian model averaging within families to
provide inferences about parameters that are independent of further assumptions about model structure. We illustrate the
methods using Dynamic Causal Models of brain imaging data.
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Introduction
Mathematical models of scientific data can be formally compared
using Bayesian model evidence [1–3], an approach that is now
widely used in statistics [4], signal processing [5], machine learning
[6], natural language processing [7], and neuroimaging [8–10]. An
emerging area of application is the evaluation of dynamical system
models represented using differential equations, both in neuroim-
aging [11] and systems biology [12–14].
Much previous practice in these areas has focussed on model
selection in which one first selects the model with the highest
evidence and then makes inferences based on the parameters of
that model [15–18]. This ‘best model’ approach is very useful but,
as we shall see, can become brittle if there are a large number of
models to compare, or if in the analysis of data from a group of
subjects, different subjects use different models (as is the case for a
random effects analysis [19]). This brittleness, refers to the fact that
which is the best model can depend critically on which set of
models are being compared. In random effects analysis, augment-
ing the comparison set with a single extra model can, for example,
reverse the ranking of the best and second best models. To address
this issue we propose the combination of two further approaches (i)
family level inference and (ii) Bayesian model averaging within
families.
We envisage that these methods will be useful for the
comparison of large numbers of models (eg. tens, hundreds or
thousands). In the context of neuroimaging, for example,
inferences about changes in brain connectivity can be made using
Dynamic Causal Models [20,21]. These are differential equation
models which relate neuronal activity in different brain areas using
a dynamical systems approach. One can then ask a number of
generic questions. For example: Is processing serial or parallel? Is
it linear or nonlinear? Is it mediated by changes in forward or
backward connections? A schematic of a DCM used in this paper
is shown in Figure 1. The particular questions we will address in
this paper are (i) which regions receive driving input? and (ii) which
connections are modulated by other experimental factors?
This paper proposes that the above questions are best answered
by ‘Family level inference’. That is inference at the level of model
families, rather than at the level of the individual models
themselves. As a simple example, in previous work [19] we have
considered comparison of a number of DCMs, half of which
embodied linear hemodynamics and half nonlinear hemodynam-
ics. The model space was thus partitioned into two families; linear
and nonlinear. One can compute the relative evidence of the two
model families to answer the question: does my imaging data
provide evidence in favour of linear versus nonlinear hemody-
namics? This effectively removes uncertainty about aspects of
model structure other than the characteristic of interest.
We have provided a simple illustration of this approach in
previous work [19]. We now provide a formal introduction to
family level inference and describe the key issues. These include,
importantly, the issue of how to deal with families that do not
contain the same number of models. Additionally, this paper
shows how Bayesian model averaging can be used to provide a
summary measure of likely parameter values for each model
family. We provide an example of family-level inference using data
from neuroimaging, a DCM study of auditory word processing,
but envisage that the methods can be applied throughout the
biological sciences. Before proceeding we note that the use of
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Bayesian statistics [4], but has yet to be applied extensively in
computational biology. The use of model families is also
accomodated naturally within the framework of hierarchical
Bayesian models [1] and is proposed to address the well known
issue of model dilution [4].
Materials and Methods
This section first briefly reviews DCM and methods for
computing the model evidence. We then review the fixed and
random effects methods for group level model inference, which
differ as to whether or not subjects are thought to use the same or a
different model. This includes the description of a novel Gibbs
sampling method for random effects model inference that is useful
when there are many models to compare. We then show that, for
random effects inference, the selection of the single best model can
be criticallydependent onthesetofmodelsthat areto becompared.
This then motivates the subsequent subsection on family level
inference, in which inferences about model characteristics are
invariant to the comparison set. We describe family level inference
in both a fixed and random effects context. The final subsection
then describes a sample-based algorithm for implementing Bayesian
model averaging using the notion of model families.
Dynamic Causal Models
Dynamic Causal Modelling is a framework for fitting differential
equation models of neuronal activity to brain imaging data using
Bayesian inference. The DCM approach can be applied to
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Electroenceph-
alographic (EEG), Magnetoencephalographic (MEG), and Local
Field Potential (LFP) data [22]. The empirical work in this paper
uses DCM for fMRI. DCMs for fMRI comprise a bilinear model
for the neurodynamics and an extended Balloon model [23] for
the hemodynamics. The neurodynamics are described by the
following multivariate differential equation
_ z zt~ Az
X M
j~1
ut(j)Bj
 !
ztzCut ð1Þ
where t indexes continuous time and the dot notation denotes a
time derivative. The ith entry in zt corresponds to neuronal
activity in the ith region, and ut(j) is the jth experimental input.
A DCM is characterised by a set of ‘exogenous connections’, A,
that specify which regions are connected and whether these
connections are unidirectional or bidirectional. We also define a
Figure 1. Dynamic Causal Models. The DCMs in this paper were used to analyse fMRI data from three brain regions: (i) left posterior temporal
sulcus (region P), (ii) left anterior superior temporal sulcus (region A) and (iii) pars orbitalis of the inferior frontal gyrus (region F). The DCMs
themselves comprised the following variables; experimental inputs ut(1) for auditory stimulation and ut(2) for speech intelligibility, a neuronal activity
vector zt with three elements (one for each region P, A, and F), exogenous connections specified by the three-by-three connectivity matrix A (dotted
arrows in figure), modulatory connections specified by three-by-three modulatory matrics Bj for inputs j~1::2 (the solid line ending with a filled
circle denotes the single non-zero entry for this particular model), and a 3-by-2 direct input connectivity matrix C with non-zero entries shown by
solid arrows. The dynamics of this model are govenered by equation 1. All DCMs in this paper used all-to-all endogenous connectivity ie. there were
endogenous connections between all three regions. Different models were set up by specifying which regions received direct (auditory) input (non-
zero entries in C) and which connections could be modulated by the speech intelligibility (non-zero entries in the matrix B2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g001
Author Summary
Bayesian model comparison provides a formal method for
evaluating different computational models in the biolog-
ical sciences. Emerging application domains include
dynamical models of neuronal and biochemical networks
based on differential equations. Much previous work in
this area has focussed on selecting the single best model.
This approach is useful but can become brittle if there are
a large number of models to compare and if different
subjects use different models. This paper shows that these
problems can be overcome with the use of Family Level
Inference and Bayesian Model Averaging within model
families.
Comparing Model Families
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 2 March 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e1000709set of input connections, C, that specify which inputs are
connected to which regions, and a set of modulatory connections,
Bj, that specify which intrinsic connections can be changed by
which inputs. The overall specification of input, intrinsic and
modulatory connectivity comprise our assumptions about model
structure. This in turn represents a scientific hypothesis about the
structure of the large-scale neuronal network mediating the
underlying cognitive function. A schematic of a DCM is shown
in Figure 1.
In DCM, neuronal activity gives rise to fMRI activity by a
dynamic process described by an extended Balloon model [24] for
each region. This specifies how changes in neuronal activity give
rise to changes in blood oxygenation that are measured with
fMRI. It involves a set of hemodynamic state variables, state
equations and hemodynamic parameters, h. In brief, for the ith
region, neuronal activity z(i) causes an increase in vasodilatory
signal si that is subject to autoregulatory feedback. Inflow fi
responds in proportion to this signal with concomitant changes in
blood volume vi and deoxyhemoglobin content qi.
_ s si~z(i){kisi{ci(fi{1)
_ f f i~si
ti_ v vi~fi{v
1=a
i
ti_ q qi~fi
E(fi,ri)
ri
{v
1=a
i
qi
vi
ð2Þ
Outflow is related to volume fout~v1=a through Grubb’s expo-
nent a [20]. The oxygen extraction is a function of flow
E(f,r)~1{(1{r)
1=f where r is resting oxygen extraction
fraction. The Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) signal
is then taken to be a static nonlinear function of volume and
deoxyhemoglobin that comprises a volume-weighted sum of extra-
and intra-vascular signals [20]
yi~g(qi,vi)
~V0 k1(1{qi)zk2(1{
qi
vi
)zk3(1{vi)
  
k1~7ri
k2~2
k3~2ri{0:2
ð3Þ
where V0~0:02 is resting blood volume fraction. The hemody-
namic parameters comprise h~fk,c,t,a,rg and are specific to
each brain region. Together these equations describe a nonlinear
hemodynamic process that converts neuronal activity in the i th
region zi to the fMRI signal yi (which is additionally corrupted by
additive Gaussian noise). Full details are given in [20,23].
In DCM, model parameters h~fA,B,C,hg are estimated using
Bayesian methods. Usually, the B parameters are of greatest
interest as these describe how connections between brain regions
are dependent on experimental manipulations. For a given DCM
indexed by m, a prior distribution, p(hDm) is specified using
biophysical and dynamic constraints [20]. The likelihood, p(yDh,m)
can be computed by numerically integrating the neurodynamic
(equation 1) and hemodynamic processes (equation 2). The
posterior density p(hDm,Y) is then estimated using a nonlinear
variational approach described in [23,25]. Other Bayesian
estimation algorithms can, of course, be used to approximate the
posterior density. Reassuringly, posterior confidence regions found
using the nonlinear variational approach have been found to be
very similar to those obtained using a computationally more
expensive sample-based algorithm [26].
Model Evidence
This section reviews methods for computing the evidence for a
model, m, fitted to a single data set y. Bayesian estimation provides
estimates of two quantities. The first is the posterior distribution
over model parameters p(hDm,y) which can be used to make
inferences about model parameters h. The second is the
probability of the data given the model, otherwise known as the
model evidence. In general, the model evidence is not straight-
forward to compute, since this computation involves integrating
out the dependence on model parameters
p(yDm)~
ð
p(yDh,m)p(hDm)dh: ð4Þ
A common technique for approximating the above integral is
the Variational Bayes (VB) approach [27]. This is an analytic
method that can be formulated by analogy with statistical physics
as a gradient ascent on the ‘negative variational Free Energy’ (or
Free Energy for short), F(m), of the system. This quantity is
related to the model evidence by the relation [27,28]
logp(yDm)~F(m)zKL(q(hDy,m)DDp(hDy,m)): ð5Þ
where the last term in Eq.(5) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence between an ‘approximate’ posterior density, q(hDy,m),
and the true posterior, p(hDy,m). This quantity is always positive,
or zero when the densities are identical, and therefore log p(yDm)
is bounded below by F(m). Because the evidence is fixed (but
unknown), maximising F(m) implicitly minimises the KL
divergence. The Free Energy then becomes an increasingly tighter
lower bound on the desired log-model evidence. Under the
assumption that this bound is tight, model comparison can then
proceed using F(m) as a surrogate for the log-model evidence.
The Free Energy is but one approximation to the model
evidence, albeit one that is widely used in neuroimaging [29,30]. A
simpler approximation, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
[11], uses a fixed complexity penalty for each parameter. This is to
be compared with the free energy approach in which the
complexity penalty is given by the KL-divergence between the
prior and approximate posterior [11]. This allows parameters to
be differentially penalised. If, for example, a parameter is
unchanged from its prior, there will be no penalty. This
adaptability makes the Free Energy a better approximation to
the model evidence, as has been shown empirically [6,31].
There are also a number of sample-based approximations to the
model evidence. For models with small numbers of parameters the
PosteriorHarmomicMeanprovidesagoodapproximation.Thishas
been used in neuroscience applications, for example, to infer based
on spike data whether neurons are responsive to particular features,
and if so what form the dependence takes [32]. For models with a
larger number of parameters the evidence can be well approximated
using Annealed Importance Sampling(AIS) [33]. In a comparison of
sample-based methods using synthetic data from biochemical
networks, AIS provided the best balance between accuracy and
computationtime[13].Inothercomparisons,basedonsimulationof
graphical model structures [6] the Free Energy method approached
the performance of AIS and clearly outperformed BIC. In this paper
model evidence is approximated using the Free Energy.
Comparing Model Families
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Neuroimaging data sets usually comprise data from multiple
subjects as the perhaps subtle cognitive effects one is interested in
are often only manifest at the group level. In this and following
sections we therefore consider group model inference where we fit
models m~1::M to data from subjects n~1::N. Every model is
fitted to every subjects data. In Fixed Effects (FFX) Analysis it is
assumed that every subject uses the same model, whereas Random
Effects (RFX) Analysis allows for the possibility that different
subjects use different models. This section focusses on FFX.
Given that our overall data set, Y, which comprises data for
each subject, yn, is independent over subjects, we can write the
overall model evidence as
p(YDm)~P
N
n~1
p(ynDm)
log p(YDm)~
X N
n~1
log p(ynDm)
ð6Þ
Bayesian inference at the model level can then be implemented
using Bayes rule
p(mDY)~
p(YDm)p(m)
P M
m~1
p(YDm)p(m)
ð7Þ
Under uniform model priors, p(m), the comparison of a pair of
models, m~i and m~j, can be implemented using the Bayes
Factor which is defined as the ratio of model evidences
BFij~
p(YDm~i)
p(YDm~j)
ð8Þ
Given only two models and uniform priors, the posterior model
probability is greater than 0.95 if the BF is greater than twenty.
Bayes Factors have also been stratified into different ranges
deemed to correspond to different strengths of evidence. ‘Strong’
evidence, for example, corresponds to a BF of over twenty [34].
Under non-uniform priors, pairs of models can be compared using
Odds Ratios. The prior and posterior Odds Ratios are defined as
p0
ij~
p(m~i)
p(m~j)
ð9Þ
pij~
p(m~iDY)
p(m~jDY)
resepectively, and are related by the Bayes Factor
pij~BFij|p0
ij ð10Þ
When comparing two models across a group of subjects, one can
multiply the individual Bayes factors (or exponentiate the sum of
log evidence differences); this is referred to as the Group Bayes
Factor (GBF) [16]. As is made clear in [19] the GBF approach
implicitly assumes that every subject uses the same model. It is
therefore a Fixed Effects analysis. If one believes that the optimal
model structure is identical across subjects, then an FFX approach
is entirely valid. This assumption is warranted when studying a
basic physiological mechanism that is unlikely to vary across
subjects, such as the role of forward and backward connections in
visual processing [35].
Random Effects Analysis
An alternative procedure for group level model inference allows
for the possibility that different subjects use different models. This
may be the case in neuroimaging when investigating pathophys-
iological mechanisms in a spectrum disease or when dealing with
cognitive tasks that can be performed with different strategies.
RFX inference is based on the characteristics of the population
from which the subjects are drawn. Given a candidate set of
m~1::M models, we denote rm as the frequency with which
model m is used in the population. We also refer to rm as the
model probability.
We define a prior distribution over rm which in this paper, and
in previous work [19], is taken to be a Dirichlet density (but see
later)
p(rDa)~Dir(a)~
1
Z(a) P
M
m~1
ram{1
m ð11Þ
where Z(a) is a normalisation term and the parameters, am, are
strictly positively valued and can be interpreted as the number of
times model m has been observed or selected. For am§1 the
density is convex in r-space, whereas for amv1 it is concave.
Given that we have drawn n~1::N subjects from the
population of interest we then define the indicator variable anm
as equal to unity if model m has been assigned to subject n. The
probability of the ‘assignation vector’, an, is then given by the
multinomial density
p(anDr)~Mult(r)~ P
M
m~1
ranm
m ð12Þ
The model evidence, p(ynDm), together with the above densities for
model probabilities and model assignations constitutes a genera-
tive model for the data, Y (see figure 1 in [19]). This model, can
then be inverted to make inferences about the model probabilites
from experimental data. Such an inversion has been described in
previous work, which developed an approximate inference
procedure based on a variational approximation [19] (this was
in addition to the variational approximation used to compute the
Free Energy for each model). The robustness and accuracy of this
method was verified via simulations using data from synthetic
populations with known frequencies of competing models [19].
This algorithm produces an approximation to the posterior density
p(rDY) on which subsequent RFX inferences are based.
As we shall see in the following section, unbiased family level
inferences require uniform priors over families. This requires that
the prior model counts, aprior(m), take on very small values (see
equation 24). These values become smaller as the number of
models in a family increases. It turns out that although the
variational algorithm is robust for aprior(m)§1, it is not accurate
for aprior(m)vv 1. This is a generic problem with the VB
approach and is explained further in the the supporting material
(see file Text S1). For this reason, in this paper we choose to take a
Gibbs sampling instead of a VB approach. Additionally, the use of
Gibbs sampling allows us to relax the assumption made in VB that
the posterior densities over a and r factorise [19]. Gibbs sampling
is the Monte-Carlo method of choice when it is possible to
iteratively sample from the conditional posteriors [1]. Fortunately,
this is the case with the RFX models as we can iterate between
sampling from p(rDa,Y) and p(aDr,Y). Such iterated sampling
Comparing Model Families
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and p(aDY) by allowing for a sufficient burn-in period after which
the Markov-chain will have converged [1]. The procedure is
described in the following section.
Gibbs sampling for random effects inference over models.
First, model probabilites are drawn from the prior distribution
r*Dir(aprior) ð13Þ
where by default we set aprior(m)~a0 for all m (but see later). For
each subject n~1::N and model m~1::M we use the model
evidences from model inversion to compute
unm~exp log p(ynDm)zlog rm ðÞ ð 14Þ
gnm~
unm
P M
m~1
unm
Here, gnm is our posterior belief that model m generated the data
from subject n (these posteriors will be used later for Bayesian model
averaging). For each subject, model assignation vectors are then
drawn from the multinomial distribution
an*Mult(gn) ð15Þ
We then compute new model counts
bm~
X N
n~1
anm
am~aprior(m)zbm
ð16Þ
and draw new model probabilities
r*Dir(a) ð17Þ
Equations 14 to 17 are then iterated Nd times. For the results in this
paper we used a total of Nd~20,000 samples and discarded the first
10,000. These remaining samples then constitute our approximation
to the posterior distribution p(rDY). From this density we can
compute usual quantities such as the posterior expectation, denoted
E½rDY  or vrDYw. This completes the description of model level
inference.
The above algorithm was derived for Dirichlet priors over
model probabilities (see equation 11). The motivation for the
Dirichlet form originally derived from the use of a free-form VB
approximation [27] in which the optimal form for the approxi-
mate posterior density over r would be a Dirichlet if the prior over
r was also a Dirichlet. This is not a concern in the context of Gibbs
sampling. In principle any prior density over r will do, but for
continuity with previous work we follow the Dirichlet approach.
We end this section by noting that the Gibbs sampling method
is to be preferred over the VB implementation for model level
inferences in which the number of models exceeds the number of
subjects, MwN. This is because it is important that the total prior
count, Ma0, does not dominate over the number of subjects,
otherwise posterior densities will be dominated by the prior rather
than the data. This is satisfied, for example, by a0~1=M.
However, as described in the the supporting material (see file Text
S1), the VB implementation does not work well for small a0. But if
we wish to compare a small number of models then VB is the
preferred method because it is faster as well as being accurate, as
shown in previous simulations [19].
Comparison Set
We have so far described procedures for Bayesian inference
over models m~1::M. These models comprise the comparison
set, S. This section points out a number of generic features of
Bayesian model comparison.
First, for any data set there exists an infinite number of possible
models that could explain it. The purpose of model comparison is
not to discover a ‘true’ model, but to determine that model, given
a set of plausible alternatives, which is most ‘useful’, ie. represents
an optimal balance between accuracy and complexity. In other
words Bayesian model inference has nothing to say about ‘true’
models. All that it provides is an inference about which is more
likely, given the data, among a set of candidate models.
Second, we emphasise that posterior model probabilities depend
on the comparison set. For FFX inference this can be clearly seen
in equation 7 where the denominator is given by a sum over S.
Similarly, for RFX inference, the dependence of posterior model
probabilities on the comparison set can be seen in equation 14.
Other factors being constant, posterior model probabilities are
therefore likely to be smaller for larger S.
Our third point relates to the ranking of models. For FFX
analysis the relative ranking of a pair of models is not depen-
dent on S. That is, if p(m~iDY,S1)wp(m~jDY,S1) then
p(m~iDY,S2)wp(m~jDY,S2) for any two comparison sets S1
and S2 that contain models i and j. This follows trivially from
equation 7 as the comparison set acts only as a normalisation term.
However, for group random effects inference the ranking of
models can be critically dependent on the comparison set. That is,
if E½riDY,S1 wE½rjDY,S1  then it could be that E½rjDY,S2 w
E½riDY,S2  where E½riDY,Sk  is the posterior expected probability
of model i given comparison set Sk. The same holds for other
quantities derived from the posterior over r, such as the
exceedance probability (see [19] and later). This means that the
decision as to which is the best model depends on S. This property
arises because different subjects can use different models and we
illustrate it with the following example.
Consider that S1 comprises just two models m~1 and m~2.
Further assume that we have N~17 subjects and model m~1 is
preferred by 7 of these subjects and m~2 by the remaining 10.
We assume, for simplicity, that the degrees of preference (ie
differences in evidence) are the same for each subject. The
quantity E½rmDY  then simply reflects the proportion of sub-
jects that prefer model m [19]. So E½r1DY,S1 ~7=17~0:41,
E½r2DY,S1 ~10=17~0:59 and for comparison set S1 model 2 is
the highest ranked model. Although the differences in posterior
expected values are small the corresponding differences in
exceedance probabilities will be much greater. Now consider a
new comparison set S2 that contains an addditional model m~3.
This model is very similar to model m~2 such that, of the ten
subjects who previously preferred it, six still do but four now prefer
model m~3. Again, assuming identical degrees of preference, we
now have E½r1DY,S2 7=17~0:41, E½r2DY,S2 ~6=17~0:35 and
E½r3DY,S2 ~4=17~0:24. So, for comparison set S2 model m~1 is
now the best model. So which is the best model: model one or two?
We suggest that this seeming paradox shows, not that group
random effects inference is unreliable, but that it is not always
appropriate to ask which is the best model. As is usual in Bayesian
inference it is wise to consider the full posterior density rather than
just the single maximum posterior value. We can ask what is
common to models two and three. Perhaps they share some
Comparing Model Families
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or other characteristic such as nonlinearity. If one were to group
the models based on this characteristic then the inference about the
characteristic would be robust. This notion of grouping models
together is formalised using family-level inference which is
described in the following section. One can then ask: of the
models that have this characteristic what are the typical parameter
values? This can be addressed using Bayesian Model Averaging
within families.
Family Inference
To implement family level inference one must specify which
models belong to which families. This amounts to specifying a
partition, F, which splits S into k~1::K disjoint subsets. The
subset fk contains all models belonging family k and there are Nk
models in the k th subset.
Different questions can be asked by specifying different
partitions. For example, to test model space for the ‘effect of
linearity’ one would specify a partition into linear and nonlinear
subsets. One could then test the same model space for the ‘effect of
seriality’ using a different partition comprising serial and parallel
subsets. The subsets must be non-overlapping and their union
must be equal to S. For example, when testing for effects of
‘‘seriality’’, some models may be neither serial or parallel; these
models would then define a third subset.
The usefulness of the approach is that many models (perhaps all
models) are used to answer (perhaps) all questions. This is similar
to factorial experimental designs in psychology [36] where data
from all cells are used to assess the strength of main effects and
interactions. We now relate the two-levels of inference: family and
model.
Fixed effects. To avoid any unwanted bias in our inference
we wish to have a uniform prior at the family level
p(fk)~
1
K
ð18Þ
Given that this is related to the model level as
p(fk)~
X
m[fk
p(m) ð19Þ
the uniform family prior can be implemented by setting
p(m)~
1
KNk
Vm [ fk ð20Þ
The posterior distribution over families is then given by summing
up the relevant posterior model probabilities
p(fkDY)~
X
m[fk
p(mDY) ð21Þ
where the posterior over models is given by equation 7. Because
posterior probabilities can be very close to unity we will sometimes
quote one minus the posterior probability. This is the combined
probability of the alternative hypotheses which we refer to as the
alternative probability, p(f kDY).
Random effects. The family probabilities are given by
sk~
X
m[fk
rm ð22Þ
where sk is the frequency of the family of models in the population.
We define a prior distribution over this probability using a
Dirichlet density
p(s)~Dir(c) ð23Þ
A uniform prior over family probabilities can be obtained by
setting ck~1 for all k. From equations 13 and 22 we see that this
can be achieved by setting
aprior(m)~
1
Nk
Vm [ fk ð24Þ
We can then run the Gibbs sampling method described above for
drawing samples from the posterior density p(rDY). Samples from
the family probability posterior, p(sDY), can then be computed
using equation 22.
The posterior means, vskDYw, are readily computed from
these samples. Another option is to compute an exceedance
probability, Qk, which corresponds to the belief that family k is
more likely than any other (of the K families compared), given the
data from all subjects:
Qk~p(skDYwsjDY,Vj=k) ð25Þ
Exceedance probabilities are particularly intuitive when compar-
ing just two families as they can be written:
Q1~p(s1ws2DY)~p(s1w0:5DY): ð26Þ
Family level inference addresses the issue of ‘dilution’ in model
selection [4]. If one uses uniform model priors and many models
are similar, then excessive prior probability is allocated to this set
of similar models. One way of avoiding this problem is to use
priors which dilute the probability within subsets of similar models
([4]). Grouping models into families, and setting model priors
according to eg. equation 24, achieves exactly this.
Bayesian Model Averaging
So far, we have dealt with inference on model-space, using
partitions into families. We now consider inference on parameters.
Usually, the key inference is on models, while the maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimates of parameters are reported to provide a
quantitative interpretation of the best model (or family).
Alternatively, people sometimes use subject-specific MAP esti-
mates as summary statistics for classical inference at the group
level. These applications require only a point (MAP) estimate.
However for completeness, we now describe how to access the full
posterior density on parameters, from which MAP estimates can
be harvested.
The basic idea here is to use Bayesian model averaging within a
family; in other words, summarise family-specific coupling
parameters in a way that avoids brittle assumptions about any
particular model. For example, the marginal posterior for subject n
and family k is
p(hnDY,m [ fk)~
X
m[fk
q(hnDyn,m)p(mnDY) ð27Þ
where q(hnDY,m)&p(hnDY,m) is our variational approximation
to the subject specific posterior and p(mnDY) is the posterior
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p(mnDY)~p(mDY) under the FFX assumption that all subjects use
the same model, or p(mnDY)~gnm under the RFX assumption
that each subject uses their own model (see equation 14).
Finally, to provide a single posterior density over subjects one
can define the parameters for an average subject
h~
1
N
X N
n~1
hn ð28Þ
and compute the posterior density p(hDY) from the above relation
and the individual subject posteriors from equation 27.
Equation 27 arises from a straightforward application of
probability theory in which a marginal probability is computed
by marginalising over quantities one is uninterested in (see also
equation 4 for marginalising over parameters). Use of equation 27
in this context is known as Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)
[4,37]. In neuroimaging BMA has previously been used for source
reconstruction of MEG and EEG data [9]. We stress that no
additional assumptions are required to implement equation 27.
One can make fk [ S small or large. If we make fk~S, the entire
model-space, the posteriors on the parameters become conven-
tional Bayesian model averages where p(hDY,m [ S)~p(hDY).
Conversely, if we make fk~m, a single model, we get con-
ventional parameter inference of the sort used when selecting the
best model; i.e., fk~mMAP. This is formally identical to using
p(hDY) under the assumption that the posterior model density is a
point mass at mMAP. More generally, we want to average within
families of similar models that have been identified by inference
on families.
One can see from equation 27 that models with low probability
contribute little to the estimate of the marginal density. This
property can be made use of to speed up the implementation of
BMA by excluding low probability models from the summation.
This can be implemented by including only models for which
p(mDY)
p(mMAPDY)
§pOCC ð29Þ
where pOCC is the minimal posterior odds ratio. Models satisfying
this criterion are said to be in Occam’s window [38]. The number
of models in the window, NOCC, is a useful indicator as smaller
values correspond to peakier posteriors. In this paper we use
pOCC~1=20. We emphasise that the use of Occam’s window is for
computational expedience only.
Although it is fairly simple to compute the MAP estimates of the
Bayesian parameter (MAP) averages analytically, the full posteriors
per se have a complicated form. This is because they are mixtures
of Gaussians (and delta functions for models where some
parameters are precluded a priori). This means the posteriors
can be multimodal and are most simply evaluated by sampling.
The sampling approach can be implemented as follows. This
generates i~1::NBMA samples from the posterior density p(hDY).
For each sample, i, and subject n we first select a model as follows.
For RFX we draw from
mi*Mult(gn) ð30Þ
where the mth element of the vector gn is the posterior model
probability for subject n, gnm (we will use the expected values from
equation 14). For FFX the model probabilities are the same for all
subjects and we draw from
mi*Mult(r) ð31Þ
where r is the M|1 vector of posterior model probabilities with
mth element equal to rm~p(mDY). For each subject one then
draws a single parameter vector, hin from the subject and model
specific posterior
hin*q(hnDyn, mi) ð32Þ
These N samples can then be averaged to produce a single sample
hi~
1
N
X N
n~1
hin ð33Þ
One then generates another sample by repeating steps 30/31, 32
and 33. The i~1::NBMA samples then provide a sample-based
representation of the posterior density p(hDY) from which the
usual posterior means and exceedance probabilities can be
derived. Model averaging can also be restricted to be within-
subject (using equations 30/31 and 32 only). Summary statistics
from the resulting within-subject densities can then be entered into
standard random effects inference (eg using t-tests) [19].
For any given parameter, some models assume that the
parameter is zero. Other models allow it to be non-zero and its
value is estimated. The posterior densities from equation 27 will
therefore include a delta function at zero, the height of which
corresponds to the posterior probability mass of models which
assume that the parameter is zero. For the applications in this
paper, the posterior densities from equation 27 will therefore
correspond to a mixture of delta functions and Gaussians because
q(hnDyn,mi) for DCMs have a Gaussian form. This is reminiscent
of the model selection priors used in [39] but in our case we have
posterior densities.
Results
We illustrate the methods using neuroimaging data from a
previously published study on the cortical dynamics of intelligible
speech [17]. This study applied dynamic causal modelling of fMRI
responses to investigate activity among three key multimodal
regions: the left posterior and anterior superior temporal sulcus
(subsequently referred to as regions P and A respectively) and pars
orbitalis of the inferior frontal gyrus (region F). The aim of the
study was to see how connections among regions depended on
whether the auditory input was intelligible speech or time-reversed
speech. Full details of the experimental paradigm and imaging
parameters are available in [17].
An example DCM is shown in figure 1. Other models varied as
to which regions received direct input and which connections
could be modulated by ‘speech intelligibility’. Given that each
intrinsic connection can be either modulated or not, there are
26~64 possible patterns of modulatory connections. Given that
the auditory stimulus is either a direct input to a region or is not
there are 23~8 possible patterns of input connectivity. But we
discount models without any input so this leaves 7 input patterns.
The 64 modulatory patterns were then crossed with the 7 input
patterns producing a total of M~448 different models. These
models were fitted to data from a total of N~26 subjects (see [17]
for details). Overall 26|448~11,648 DCMs were fitted. The
next two sections focus on family level inference. As this is a
methodological paper we present results using both an FFX and
RFX approach (ordinarily one would use either FFX or RFX
alone).
Comparing Model Families
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Our first family level inference concerns the pattern of input
connectivity. To this end we assign each of the m~1::448 models
to one of k~1::7 input pattern families. These are family A
(models 1 to 64), F (65 to 128), P (129 to 192), AF (193 to 256), PA
(257 to 320), PF (321 to 384) and PAF (285 to 448). Family PA, for
example, has auditory inputs to both region P and A.
The first two numerical columns of Table 1 show the posterior
family probabilities from an FFX analysis computed using equation
21. These are overwhelmingly in support of models in which region P
alone receives auditory input (alternative probability p~1:4|10{11).
The last two columns in Table 1 show the corresponding posterior
expectations and exceedance probabilities from an RFX analysis
computed using equation 25. The conclusions from RFX analysis are
less clear cut. But we can say, with high confidence (total exceedance
probability, p~0:97) that either region A alone or region P alone
receives auditory input. Out of these two possibilities it is much more
likely that region P alone receives auditory input (exceedance
probability p~0:78) rather than region A (exceedance probability
p~0:19). Figure 2 shows the posterior distributions p(skDY),f r o ma n
RFX analysis, for each of the model families.
Forward versus Backward
Having established that auditory input most likely enters region
P we now turn to a family level inference regarding modulatory
structure. For this inference we restrict our set of candidate
models, S, to the 64 models receiving input to region P. We then
assign each of these models to one of k~1::4 modulatory families.
These were specified by first defining a hierarchy with region P at
the bottom, A in the middle and F at the top; in accordance with
recent studies that tend to place F above A in the language
hierarchy [40]. For each structure we then counted the number of
forward, nF, and backward, nB, connections and defined the
following families: predominantly forward (F, nFwnB), predom-
inantly backward (B, nBwnF), balanced (BAL, nF~nB), or None.
The first two numerical columns of Table 2 show the posterior
family probabilities from an FFX analysis. We can say, with high
confidence (total posterior probability, p~0:93) that nF§nB. The
last two columns in Table 2 show the posterior expectations and
exceedance probabilities from an RFX analysis. These were
computed from the posterior densities shown in Figure 3. The
conclusions we draw, in this case, are identical to those from the
FFX analysis. That is, we can say, with high confidence (total
exceedance probability, p~0:94) that nF§nB.
Relating Family and Model Levels
Family level posteriors are related to model level posteriors via
summation over family members according to equation 21 for
FFX and equation 22 for RFX. Figure 4 shows the how the
posterior probabilities over input families break down into
posterior probabilities for individual models. Figure 5 shows the
same for the modulatory families.
The maximum posterior model for the input family inference is
model number 185 having posterior probability p(mDY)~0:0761.
Given that all families have the same number of members, the
model priors are uniform, so the maximum posterior model is also
the one with highest aggregate model evidence. This model has
input to region P and modulatory connections as shown in
Figure 6(a).
The model evidence for the DCMs fitted in this paper was
computed using the free energy approximation. This is to be
contrasted with previous work in which (the most conservative of)
AIC and BIC was used [17]. One notable difference arising from
this distinction is that the top-ranked models in [17] contained
significantly fewer connections than those in this paper (one
Table 1. Inference over input families.
Input FFX RFX
Posterior
p(fkDY)
Log Posterior
log p(fkDY)
Expected
vskDYw
exceedance
Qk
A 0.00 225.33 0.27 0.19
F 0.00 255.08 0.16 0.03
P 1.00 0.00 0.44 0.78
AF 0.00 286.97 0.03 0.00
PA 0.00 261.70 0.03 0.00
PF 0.00 268.59 0.03 0.00
PAF 0.00 2134.67 0.03 0.00
All values are tabulated to two decimal places (dp). For an FFX inference, the
alternative probability for input family P is p(f 3DY)~1:4|10{11. The expected
and exceedance probabilities for RFX were computed from the posterior
densities shown in Figure 2. For RFX inference the total exceedance probability
that either region A alone or region P alone receives auditory input is p~0:97.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.t001
Figure 2. RFX posterior densities for input families. The histograms show p(skDy) versus sk for the k~1::7 input families. Input family ‘P’ has the
highest posterior expected probability vskDYw~0:44. See Table 1 for other posterior expectations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g002
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contained an average 2.4 modulatory connections whereas those
in this paper contained an average of 4.5. This difference reflects
the fact that the AIC/BIC approximation to the log evidence
penalizes models for each additional connection (parameter)
without considering interdependencies or covariances amongst
parameters, whereas the free energy approximation takes such
dependencies into account.
Model Averaging
We now follow up the family-level inferences about input
connectionswith Bayesian model averaging.As previouslydiscussed,
this is especially useful when the posterior model density is not
sharply peaked, as is the case here (see Figure 4. All of the averaging
results in this paper are obtained with an Occam’s window defined
using a minimal posterior odds ratio of pOCC~1=20.
For FFX inference the input was inferred to enter region P only.
We therefore restrict the averaging to those 64 models in family P.
This produces 16 models in Occam’s window (itself indicating that
the posterior is not sharply peaked). The worst one is m~163 with
p(mDY)~0:0504. The posterior odds of the best relative to the
worst is only 1:51 (the largest it could be is 1=pOCC), meaning these
models are not significantly better than one another. Four of the
models in Occam’s window are shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows
the posterior densities of average modulatory connections
(averaging over models and subjects). The height of the delta
functions in these histograms correspond to the total posterior
probability mass of models which assume that the connection is
zero.
For RFX inference the input was inferred to most likely enter
region P alone (posterior exceedance probability, wk~0:78). In the
RFX model averaging the Occam’s windowing procedure was
specific to each subject, thus each subject can have a different number
of models in Occam’s window. For the input model P family there
were an average of NOCC~30+5 models in Occam’s window and
Figure 8 shows the posterior densities of the average modulatory
connections (averaging over models and subjects). Both the RFX and
FFXmodelaverageswithinfamilyPshowthatonlyconnectionsfrom
P to A, and from P to F, are facilitated by speech intelligibility.
Discussion
This paper has investigated the formal comparison of models
using Bayesian model evidence. Previous application of the method
in the biological sciences has focussed on model selection in which
one first selects the model with the highest evidence and then makes
inferences based on the parameters of that model. We have shown
that this ‘best model’ approach, though useful when the number of
models is small, can become brittle if there are a large number of
models, and if different subjects use different models.
To overcome this shortcoming we have proposed the combi-
nation of two further approaches (i) family level inference and (ii)
Bayesian model averaging within families. Family level inference
Figure 3. RFX Posterior densities for modulatory families. The histograms show p(skDy) versus sk for the k~1::4 modulatory families.
Modulatory family ‘F’ has the highest posterior expected probability vskDYw~0:52. See Table 2 for other posterior expectations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g003
Table 2. Inference over modulatory families.
Modulation FFX RFX
Posterior
p(fkDY)
Log Posterior
log p(fkDY)
Expected
vskDYw
exceedance
Qk
Forward, nFwnB 0.64 20.44 0.52 0.66
Backard, nBwnF 0.07 22.71 0.13 0.06
Balanced, nF~nB 0.29 21.22 0.28 0.28
None 0.00 238.37 0.07 0.00
All values are tabulated to two decimal places (dp).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.t002
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posterior probability mass. For RFX (bottom panel) models in both A and P families have high posterior expected probability, although the
probability mass for P dominates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g004
Figure 5. Model level inference for modulatory families. For FFX (top panel) the figure shows that models in the F and BAL families have most
probability mass. The expected posteriors from the RFX inference show a similar pattern (bottom panel). The ordering of models in this figure is not
the same as the ordering of P models in figure 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g005
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the characteristic one is interested in. Bayesian model averaging
can then be used to provide a summary measure of likely
parameter values for each family.
We have applied these approaches to neuroimaging data,
specifically a DCM study of auditory word processing using fMRI.
Our results indicate that spoken words most likely stimulate a
region in posterior STS and that if the word is intelligible
connections are strengthened both to anterior STS and an inferior
frontal region. These conclusions were drawn based on family
level inference and Bayesian model averaging.
The model evidence for the DCMs fitted in this paper was
computed using the free energy approximation whereas previous
work used (the most conservative of) AIC and BIC [17]. This
resulted in the highly ranked models containing significantly more
connections than in the previous study. This is due to a bias in the
AIC/BIC criterion which leads to overly simple models being
selected. Previous work in graphical models favours the free energy
approach over BIC [6] and work on biochemical models finds AIS
to be the best of the more computationally expensive sampling
methods. The relative merits of the different model selection
criteria, as applied to brain imaging models and data, will be
addressed in a future publication. The family level inference
procedures described in this paper can be applied whatever
method is used for estimating the model evidence.
Interestingly, the use of BMA produced an average network
structure with speech input to region P, and modulatory
connections from P to A and from P to F. This is exactly the
winning model from earlier work [17] (based on AIC/BIC
approximation of model evidence). It is not, however, the best
model as indicated by the free energy. The model with the highest
free energy (see figure 6(a)) does not, however, have significantly
higher evidence than the second best model, or indeed, any model
in Occam’s window. This indicates that in the particular example
we have studied the use of Bayes factors or posterior odds ratios
would be inconclusive, whereas clear conclusions can be drawn
from family level inference.
This paper has also introduced a Gibbs sampling method for
RFX model level inference when the number of models is large.
This sampling method should be preferred to the previously
suggested VB method [19] when the number of models exceeds
the number of subjects (ie. MwN). We do emphasise, however,
that for RFX model level inferences involving a small number of
models (as in previous work [19]) the VB approach is perfectly
valid, and is indeed the preferred approach because it is faster.
The issue of family versus model level inference is orthogonal to
the issue of random versus fixed effects analysis. The same critera
re. FFX versus RFX apply at the family level as at the model level.
For the data in this paper one might use RFX analysis as auditory
word processing is part of the high level language system and one
expect might expect differences in the neuronal instantiation (eg.
lateralisation). If the issue remains unclear one could adopt a more
pragmatic approach by first implementing a FFX analysis, and if
there appear to be outlying subjects, then one could follow this up
with an RFX analysis.
Family level inferences under FFX assumptions are simple to
implement. Families with (the same and) different numbers of
models are accommodated by setting model priors using equation
20, model posteriors are computed using equation 7, and family
level posteriors using equation 21. This is a simple non-iterative
procedure. Family level inferences under RFX assumptions are
more subtle and have been the main focus of this paper. Families
with (equal and) unequal numbers of models are accommodated
using the model priors in equation 24, model posteriors are
Figure 6. Likely models. The figure shows the input (filled square and solid arrow) and modulatory connectivity (solid arrows) stuctures for four
models in Occam’s window (assessed using FFX). Note that all models also have full endogenous connectivity (not shown). These four models are (a)
model m~185 with p(mDY)~0:0761, rank=1, (b) model m~191 with p(mDY)~0:0759, rank=2, (c) model m~136 with p(mDY)~0:0507, rank=15
and (d) model m~163 with p(mDY)~0:0504, rank=16. All models have auditory input entering region P.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g006
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level posteriors are computed using equation 22. We envisage that
family level inference under RFX assumptions will be particularly
useful in neuroimaging studies of high level cognition or for clinical
groups where there is a high degree of intersubject variability.
Where subjects can be clearly divided into two or more groups on
behavioural or other grounds (e.g. patients and controls), then it
would be correct to group the models accordingly, and proceed
with a between group analysis on selected parameters of the
averaged models.
Finally, we comment on the broader issue of comparison of
discretemodels(the‘Discrete’approachadoptedinthiswork) versus
a hierarchical approach embodying Automatic Relevance Deter-
mination (ARD) in which irrelevant connections are ‘switched off’
during model fitting [41] (for the case of DCMs the ARD approach
is currently hypothetical as no such algorithm has yet been
Figure 7. Average Modulatory Connections from FFX for input family P. The figures show the posterior densities of average network
parameters from fixed effects Bayesian model averaging for the modulatory connections. Only forward connections from P to A and from P to F are
modulated by speech intelligibility.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g007
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marginal density p(hDY) directly without recourseto Bayesian model
averaging. The Discrete approach allows for quantitative family-
level inferences about issues such as whether processing is serial or
parallel, linear or nonlinear. Additionally, Bayesian Model Averag-
ing can be used with the Discrete approach to provide estimates of
themarginaldensityp(hDY).Overall,theARDapproachisprobably
the preffered method if one is solely interested in the marginal
density over parameters, because it will likely be faster. If one is
additionally interested in quantitative family-level inference then the
Discrete approach would be the method of choice.
We expect that the comparison of model families will prove
useful for a range of model comparison applications in biology,
from connectivity models of brain imaging data, to behavioural
models of learning and decision making, and dynamical models in
molecular biology.
Figure 8. Average Modulatory Connections from RFX for input family P. The figures show the posterior densities of average network
parameters from random effects Bayesian model averaging for the modulatory connections. Only forward connections from P to A and from P to F
are modulated by speech intelligibility.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000709.g008
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